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SEPARATE, UNEQUAL, AND ALIEN: COMMENTS ON THE 
LIMITS OF BROWNt 
LENNI B. BENSON* 
I. Two ANNIVERSARIES 
May of 2004 marked fifty years since the U.S. Supreme Court 
unanimously ruled that the long held constitutional doctrine of 
separate but equal must fall. Brown v. Board of Education, 1 of course, 
is a case unique to its facts and circumstances. As a matter of prece-
dent Brown is a case about public elementary and secondary school 
education. But Brown is also a symbol. It is a case that stands for 
the Supreme Court's ability to transcend prior constitutional hold-
ings. In my view, it is a case that proves that the Supreme Court can 
adapt to our society's need for legally guaranteed equality of treat-
ment and equality of opportunity. It is a case that ensures that the 
rights of minorities will be protected from abuse by political majori-
ties. It is a case that aptly erodes the stone cliffs of stare decisis. 
May 2004 marks the anniversary of another Supreme Court 
case, much less welcome, at least to me, but one still upheld as a 
powerful legal doctrine. 2 The case, Galvan v. Press,3 discussed the 
rights of a lawful permanent resident to remain in the United 
States. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, ruled that a 
permanent resident alien could be deported based on a retroactive 
change in the immigration law. While Frankfurter plainly stated 
that "an alien who legally became part of the American community 
... is a 'person,' an alien [who] has the same protection for his life, 
t This essay was first presented at the Faculty Presentation Day held at New York 
Law School, March 2, 2004, and was part of a panel reflecting on the fiftieth anniversary 
of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Several New York Law School 
students made significant, appreciated, contributions to this article: Sarah Kroll-
Rosenbaum, Matthew Goldsmith, and Wendy Williams. 
* Professor of Law and Co-Director, Justice Action Center, New York Law 
School. J.D. 1983, B.S. 1980, Arizona State University. 
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2. The coincidence of the two anniversaries was first brought to my attention by 
Nancy Morawetz. See Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due 
Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 97 (1998). 
3. 347 U.S. 522 (1954). 
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liberty and property under the Due Process Clause as is afforded to 
a citizen ... "and while he went on to acknowledge that, "due pro-
cess bars Congress from enactments that shock the sense of fair play 
- which is the essence of due process ... ,"4 he ultimately con-
cluded that the retroactive law was constitutional. In his now fa-
mous opinion Frankfurter wrote: 
[M] uch could be said for the view, were we writing on a 
clean slate, that the Due Process Clause qualifies the scope 
of political discretion heretofore recognized as belonging 
to Congress in regulating the entry and deportation of 
aliens. And since the intrinsic consequences of deporta-
tion are so close to punishment for crime, it might fairly 
be said also that the ex post facto Clause, even though ap-
plicable only to punitive legislation, should be applied to 
deportation. But the slate is not clean. As to the extent 
of the power of Congress under review, there is not 
merely "a page of history," but a whole volume.5 
Who is the person being deported? Even the dissent calls him 
"the alien Galvan."6 Nowhere in the opinion is his first name used. 
He is simply "the alien Galvan." And, what was it about "the alien 
Galvan" that caused the Supreme Court, the same Supreme Court 
that had in the same year ruled that separate is not equal, to rule 
that retroactive application of a law to him did not violate the most 
fundamental tenets of our fairness-based system of justice? What 
distinguished him from an individual the Court would have found 
deserving of the basic protections of fundamental due process? Mr. 
Galvan was a "lawful permanent resident" but not a "citizen." This 
technical distinction in labeling, which cost Mr. Galvan the life that 
he knew and his residence in the country in which he grew up and 
lived most of his life, is just one of the many different labels that our 
immigration laws assign to define status. These technical distinc-
tions, like many others, can be arbitrary and unjust in that they as-
sign labels that in no way reflect the reality of a person's life and 
relationship to this country. In 1954, Mr. Galvan was forty-three 
years old. He had lived in the United States since he was seven. He 
4. Id. at 530. 
5. Id. at 531 (emphasis added). 
6. Id. at 534 (Douglas, J ., dissenting). 
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never applied for U.S. citizenship. He married a U.S. citizen and 
had four children. He worked as a "laborer at the Van Kamp Sea 
Food Company .... "7 In 1947 he left the country for a short visit to 
Mexico. Upon his return he was stopped and questioned by an im-
migration officer. Had he ever belonged to the Communist Party? 
Yes, he answered, but he became disillusioned and had 
dropped out in 1946. He was allowed in the country but then put 
into deportation proceedings for his past membership in the Com-
munist Party. At the time he had belonged to the Party, member-
ship was not a ground of deportability and the Party was a legal 
political organization in California. But Congress amended the 
laws to apply the penalty of deportation to past party membership. 
So, after thirty-six years of lawful residence, Galvan was ordered de-
ported to Mexico. 
Yet that desciption is far from the whole story. You will not 
find it in the case, but Robert Galvan was also active in labor polit-
ics.8 He was not merely a "laborer who worked for Van Kamp Sea-
food Company"; he was also an officer of the United Seafood 
Workers Union. He was active in civil rights demonstrations for La-
tino workers. He was among several other Latino leaders targeted 
by Jack Tenney, a California state senator who chaired the Califor-
nia Un-American Activities Committee (1941-1949).9 Tenney advo-
cated for the deportation of many labor and Latino organizers. 10 
Who is Robert Galvan? Was he a labor activist? A husband and 
father? A Communist? A Latino? A Mexican citizen? A perma-
nent resident alien? As lawyers and law students we think we know 
the answer that is relevant. We are trained to sort through the facts 
to uncover the relevant essential considerations. In constitutional 
and statutory law the relevant inquiry here is: what is this non-citi-
zen 's - this alien's - status? Our legal line-drawing starts and may 
end with the answer to that question. But does it really do justice? 
Fifty years ago, Frankfurter joined the Supreme Court in the revolu-
7. Id. at 532 (Black, J., dissenting). 
8. Carlos M. Larralde & Richard Griswold de! Castillo, Luisa Moreno and the Begin-
ning of the Mexican American Civil Rights Movement in San Diego, 43 J SAN DIEGO HIST. 3 
(1997). 
9. See EowARD L BARRETT, JR., THE TENNEY CoMMITTEE: LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGA-
TION OF SUBVERSIVE AcnVITIES IN CALIFORNIA (1951). 
10. Larralde & Griswold de! Castillo, supra note 8. 
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tionary rejection of a line-drawing that allowed non-white children 
to be segregated - separate is not equal and therefore it is unlaw-
ful. But the line of inclusion and equality in our society stopped 
short in the Galvan case. The majority accepted congressional 
power to deport Mr. Galvan, free from any substantive due process 
limitation. Alien Galvan, by never becoming a citizen, was on the 
wrong side of a legal line. 11 The line created by his lack of citizen-
ship took away Galvan's right to be protected against retroactive 
application of a law, one of the foundations of due process. 
Perhaps I should be forgiving of Justice Frankfurter. It was a 
time when Communism was greatly feared. But I am harsh, for Jus-
tice Frankfurter sat on the "right" side of this line-drawing only by 
luck. He was born in Austria and his family immigrated to the 
United States at a time when the United States had no visa require-
ment nor any quota limit on immigrants.12 Both Frankfurter and 
Galvan began their lives in the United States with the same legal 
status. Neither was called a "lawful permanent resident," for such a 
category did not exist. Both men simply entered the United States 
as immigrants. When Frankfurter's father applied for naturaliza-
tion, Frankfurter, by virtue of his minor status at the time, became a 
11. The Supreme Court also rejected Galvan's argument that the ex post facto 
Clause prohibited deportation laws that expel based on past legitimate conduct. The 
Court has consistently found the ex post facto Clause to limit only criminal statutes. See 
Galvan, 347 U.S. at 742-743. Once he had been a member of the Communist Party he 
was also ineligible for citizenship pursuant to the statutes of that time. Immigration 
and Nationality Act ("INA")§ 313, 8 U.S.C. § 1424 (1994). Moreover, for those lawful 
permanent residents who were not "white," citizenship was also not available because 
our naturalization laws expressly forbade non-whites from acquiring citizenship. See IAN 
F. HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAw: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996). The issue 
of whether Mexicans qualified as white had also been contested; however, a federal 
court in Texas had ruled that because Mexicans were granted full citizenships rights 
under treaty, Mexicans, including Mexicans of indigenous ethnicity, were entitled to be 
defined legally as white. See In re Rodriguez, 81 F. 337 (W.D. Tex. 1897). In 1940 Con-
gress specifically authorized all the peoples of the Western hemisphere as eligible for 
citizenship. The last racial barriers to citizenship were not removed until 1952. See, e.g., 
Kevin R. Johnson, Race Matters: Immigration Law and Policy Scholarship, Law in the Ivory 
Tower, and the Legal Indifference of the Race Critique, 2000 U. ILL L. REv. 525 (2000), Rog-
ers M. Smith, Black & White After Brown: Constructions of Race in Modern Supreme Court 
Decisions, 5 U. PA. J. CoNST. L. 709 (2003). 
12. 4 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NOMINATIONS: HEARINGS AND 
REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 
BY THE SENATEjUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 1916-1975, 124 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacob-
stein eds., 1977). 
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citizen by operation of law. Frankfurter chose citizenship no more 
than he chose to be born ajew in Austria. Galvan chose his status, 
lawful permanent resident, no more than Frankfurter chose his, yet 
Galvan's failure to naturalize would be the legal distinction that 
made Frankfurter able to support his deportation. 
II. FrFIY YEARS LATER 
This article is not meant to trace the complete and compli-
cated evolution of the rights of aliens in our society. Fifty years later 
we could still deport Mr. Galvan. 13 Still, our constitutional law 
would protect Mr. Galvan's right to be free from many forms of 
governmental discrimination, at least while he held lawful resi-
dence in the United States. The Supreme Court has not clearly 
settled how strictly the court must scrutinize legal classifications 
that bar non-citizens, albeit permanent resident aliens, from certain 
forms of employment or governmental programs such as welfare or 
food stamps. 14 Mr. Galvan, had he been allowed to remain a per-
manent resident of the United States, might have obtained a fishing 
license15 or become a notary public, 16 but he might lawfully have 
been excluded from public school teaching.17 The list is odd and 
constitutional law professors and commentators can help you wind 
your way through it and come out with a coherent rationale; but 
13. SeeINA § 237(a) (4) (iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (4) (iii) (1990): "any activity a pur-
pose of which is the opposition to, or the control or overthrow of, the Government of 
the United States by force, violence, or other unlawful means, is deportable". 
14. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (applying heightened 
scrutiny and holding that a state statute denying welfare benefits based on alien and 
resident status violates Equal Protection Clause); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) 
(applying rational review and holding that a state may confine eligibility for police force 
service to citizens); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (declaring that classification of 
undocumented persons is not entitled to heightened scrutiny, but that denial of pri-
mary education to undocumented children did not further a substantial state interest 
and was not permissible). 
15. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948). 
16. Bernal v. Painter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984) (holding that state cannot restrict li-
censing of notary publics to citizens alone). 
17. Ambach v. Nmwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (holding that state may deny teaching 
licenses to non-citizens as part of the political function exception). 
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wend and wind you must, for this area of law is anything but 
settled. 18 
While the analogy between lines drawn by race and lines drawn 
by inmigration status is not exact - certainly the government has 
some interest in regulating immigration - the lines drawn accord-
ing to immigration status have not always produced lines that are 
rational, fair, or clear. Not surprisingly, then, the case law is unset-
tled about the constitutional rights of lawful permanent residents. 
Change the label from that vaulted status, lawful permanent resi-
dent, to an alien who has not been admitted, and suddenly the le-
gal terrain is much less welcoming. Consider the stories of Freddy 
Vasquez and Brian Marroquin.19 Both grew up in Virginia and at-
tended public schools there. Both have strong academic creden-
tials and planned to attend college in Virginia. When Freddy 
applied to Virginia Tech 's architecture program, the application 
asked him to identify whether he was a citizen, a lawful permanent 
resident alien or other. Freddy Vasquez currently holds temporary 
protected status, a form of temporary safe haven which does not 
lead to permanent resident status.20 This option did not appear on 
the application for Virginia Tech; Freddie checked "other." His ap-
plication for admission to the college was denied. Brian Marroquin 
planned to apply to schools in the fall of 2004. At that time the 
legal policy of the State of Virginia denied any undocumented alien 
admission to all public universities.21 Brian believed that he would 
be denied admission based on the policy of the state of Virginia. 
Freddy Vasquez and Brian Marroquin sued the state of Virginia. 
18. See Linda Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1047 (1994). 
19. See Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
20. INA§ 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254a (1996). temporary protected status is also called 
the "safe haven" provision. It was created by Congress to authorize the U.S. Attorney 
General to recognize short term needs for temporary residence due to natural disasters 
or political turmoil. Freddy is a citizen of El Salvador. See Equal Access Educ. v. Mer-
ten, 325 F. Supp. 2d 655, 669 (E.D. Va. 2004); he came to the United States as a child to 
join his parents. See Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d. at 593. 
21. See Commonwealth of Virginia Attorney General Memorandum, Immigration 
Law Compliance Update (Sept. 5, 2002). Virginia is not alone in barring admission to 
post secondary education for those people who are not permanent residents of the 
United States or otherwise authorized to attend school under a temporary visa. For an 
excellent discussion of the issues see Michael Olivas, IIRIRA, The DREAM Act, and Un-
documented College Student Residency, 30 J.C. & U.L. 435 (2004). See also infra note 37. 
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Freddy alleged that he was not considered for admission because of 
his perceived illegal status. The court initially ruled that Freddy 
had standing to sue for perceived illegal status, but then ruled that 
Freddy no longer had standing to sue at all because there was not 
enough evidence to show that Freddy's denial of admission was 
based on immigration factors. 22 Brian's claim survived a motion to 
dismiss because he had standing based on his illegal status, but the 
claim was dismissed on summary judgment for lack of standing due 
to his illegal status. 23 The court held that an "illegal alien" does not 
have standing to challenge denial of admission to a state university. 
The court declared that states may, consistent with the Supremacy 
Clause, deny admission or enrollment to undocumented aliens, so 
long as the states use federal standards to determine status.24 Both 
Freddy and Brian are caught in a legal void: Freddy cannot show he 
was denied admission based on his perceived illegal status, because 
his status is actually legal, and Brian cannot show he suffered an 
injury from his denial of admission because of his illegal status. 
Plaintiffs asserted that Brian fell within one of the exceptions to 
"unlawful presence" and therefore held legal status.25 Interestingly, 
several pages of the opinion are devoted to deciphering exactly 
what Brian's status was under federal law. The court relied on an 
ad hoc interpretation of the statute defining the exceptions to un-
lawful presence, without any case support, and ultimately decided 
that Brian's status was "illegal."26 In spite of the obvious challenges 
the court itself faced in determining status based on federal stan-
dards, and the strong possibility of error,27 the court held that states 
are entrusted with the power of determining who is illegal based 
22. Merten, 325 F. Supp. 2d. at 669-72. The evidence consisted entirely of affidavits 
and deposition testimony by Virginia Tech admissions officers, who claimed that status 
had no bearing on Freddy's application; there was no record of any written policy of the 
school. 
23. Id. at 667. 
24. Id. at 660. The court also refused to allow the plaintiffs to pursue their claims 
anonymously. Doe v. Merten, 219 F.R.D. 387 (E.D. Va. 2004) as cited in Merten, 325 F. 
Supp. 2d at 657-58. 
25. Merten, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 663-65. 
26. Id. at 662-65. Plaintiffs argued that Brian qualified for one of the exceptions 
under "unlawfully present" status. 
27. It is noteworthy that the application to Virginia Tech has the options Citizen, 
Lawful Permanent Resident and "Other." If this is indicative of the school administra-
tion's view of the range of possible status designations, it does not bode well for the 
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upon federal standards, and thereafter may bar these "illegal" aliens 
from admission. 28 
The terms temporary protected status,29 refugee,30 asylum ap-
plicant,31 F-1,32 G-4,33 J-2,34 deferred action,35 and parolee36 are just 
a handful of the labels for the varied categories in our immigration 
laws. The media, legal decisions, and scholars constantly talk about 
immigration law and aliens as one category - to some a likely pro-
tected category, such that classification and separate treatment by 
the government would become suspect37 - but there is not one 
category. Any attempt to reduce the options to a label of legal or 
illegal simply defies the complexity of the reality. 
III. THE LEGAL BOXES ARE POROUS 
People who know the reality of immigration law are fond of 
saying that "today's illegal is tomorrow's legal alien." Consider the 
straightforward example of a person who marries a U.S. citizen and 
files for permanent residence. The current waiting period for 
processing the forms is well over a year; the process of adjudicating 
the individual's qualities and eligibility for immigration entails an-
other waiting period. The person is technically defined in the law 
as "an applicant for adjustment of status."38 Some applicants for 
adjustment of status were technically illegally present in the country 
ability of institutions of higher education to make proper determinations under federal 
standards concerning status. 
28. Merten, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 660. 
29. INA§ 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254a (1996). 
30. INA§ 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § ll0l(a)(42)(1996). 
31. INA§ 209, 8 U.S.C. § 1159 (1996). 
32. INA§ 10l(a)(l5)(F), 8 U.S.C. § ll0l(a)(l5)(F) (1994). 
33. INA§ 10l(a)(l5)(G)(i)-(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 110l(a)(l5)(G)(i)-(iv) (1994). 
34. INA§ 10l(a)(l5)(J), 8 U.S.C. § ll0l(a)(l5)(J) (1994). 
35. Deferred action is a descretionary status which government attorneys may con-
fer in unusual removal cases. See CHARLES GORDON ET AL., 6 IMMIGRATION LAw AND 
PROCEDURE § 72.03(2)(h) (rev. ed. 2004) (explaining that this exercise in administra-
tive discretion, originally known as "nonpriority" was developed for humanitarian rea-
sons and stops further action against an apparently deportable alien). 
36. INA§ 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C § ll82(d)(5) (1994). 
37. Suspect classification is a term courts generally use to indicate that legislation 
or policies affecting members of a group will be entitled to more intense scrutiny of the 
government's rationale supporting its discrimination or treatment of this group. See 
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
38. INA§ 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1996). 
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but due to their eligibility for adjustment are now in a transitional 
phase. Determining who has a bona fide eligibility for adjustment is 
only part of the determination of "legality." The ultimate decision 
about granting the adjustment is in the discretion of the agency. If 
state governments try to draw simple lines such as legal or illegal, 
documented or undocumented, they are acting in ignorance of the 
complexity of the immigration law and process. 
Let us consider another example: an individual entered the 
United States without inspection and without any documents au-
thorizing residence. He or she has lived here for many years and is 
sponsored for permanent immigration by an employer. The em-
ployer establishes that no qualified willing U.S. worker is available 
to fill the position. The employer files the required immigrant em-
ployment based visa petition and the government approves the peti-
tion. Thus the person who lived and resided here illegally is now 
the beneficiary of an approved visa petition authorizing immigra-
tion eligibility. But our law treats that person as "illegal." Until the 
individual either qualifies for adjustment (and most people who en-
tered without inspection are not eligible) or that individual departs 
the United States and applies for an immigrant visa at a U.S. consu-
late abroad, the individual is deemed to be "illegal." Neither the 
years of residence nor the approved visa petition necessarily afford 
any greater rights than the person who entered the United States 
without inspection two weeks ago. 
Until 1996, many people made the transition from illegal to 
legal by finding such a sponsoring employer or a sponsoring close 
relative, but in 1996 Congress amended the immigration laws to 
include a barrier to immigration for anyone who had overstayed or 
resided illegally in the United States for more than six months.39 
The person who overstayed or resided unlawfully for more than six 
months but less than one year is barred for three years from reen-
tering. The person who overstayed or resided unlawfully for more 
than one year is barred for ten years. While there are limited waiv-
ers ameliorating the three and ten year barriers, many people will 
not risk being stuck outside the United States, separated from em-
ployment and/ or family. Further, the waiver adjudication process 
39. INA§ 212(a) (9)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B) (1996). 
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is highly discretionary and far from transparent, and processing 
times may vary from months to years. 
Judges facing constitutional challenges by the undocumented 
alien, the alien in transition between forms of status, or even the 
lawful permanent resident are reluctant to engage in close evalua-
tion of the equities of each person's ties to the United States. 
Judges willingly defer to the decisionmaking and adjudications of 
the government agencies and defer to the agencies' classification of 
status. But this deference is shielding the harsh reality of the com-
plexity and black adjudicatory holes of the immigration agency pro-
cess. When evaluating constitutional claims, judges are allowing 
barriers like the three-year and ten-year bars to be effective in for-
bidding legalization, full incorporation into our society; the judicial 
focus on meaningless status lines to define the rights of aliens ig-
nores their humanity. This legalism creates a class of invisible peo-
ple who live among us but whom the law refuses to recognize. We 
have entire classes of people the law cannot or will not see. 
This status of invisibility is one of the worst evils of the Dred 
Scott decision.40 Until the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the per-
sonhood of people of color was severely limited and correspond-
ingly so were the constitutional rights of those the law did not 
recognize. Plessy v. Ferguson41 may have been based upon a false 
premise of separate but equal, but at least it acknowledged per-
sonhood. 42 Will we take the steps forward for aliens to be seen first 
as people? Will aliens' rights be determined not by technical legal 
status but in the context of their families, relationships, and contri-
butions to society? The rights of aliens must be seen in light of the 
very fundamental rights that so many of us take for granted as "cer-
tain unalienable rights."43 
40. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
41. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
42. Of course, in reality the government never tried to create equal institutions. 
The step foiward was a doomed illusory promise. 
43. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
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IV. MAKING THE ALIEN VISIBLE AND INCORPORATED IN 
OUR CONSTITUTION 
737 
Notwithstanding the vision of Brown as proof that the Court 
can reverse decades of discrimination, it is unrealistic to expect the 
Supreme Court to take the lead in incorporating the alien. The 
legal and social culture is far too comfortable with the technical 
line drawing. Especially in immigration law, the Supreme Court's 
deference to Congress and the Executive as to the manner in which 
they draw those lines, even if they discriminate on the basis of gen-
der, race or national origin, is both long standing and unlikely to 
change.44 Instead we must educate ourselves and our elected rep-
resentatives. We must ask more questions about why we draw lines 
between citizens, lawful permanent residents, nonimmigrants, and 
undocumented. What is our purpose? Do we know what the status 
entails? What are the bureaucratic obstacles to obtaining such sta-
tus? We must stop hiding behind the labels of status and illegality if 
we want to shape a just society. 
In 2002 I began an article with a quote from Ralph Ellison's 
Invisib/,e Man. In that piece I asked how our government can set 
labor and employment policy or immigration policy when it does 
not fully acknowledge the invisible workers among us.45 I use the 
same quote here, because Ellison has a real message for us. When 
he wrote his book Ellison was asking us to fully see the humanity 
behind the skin color of a Black person. I ask you to read his words 
and ask yourself if you see the person in the label of "alien." 
I am an invisible man. No, I am not a spook ... I am a 
man of substance, of flesh and bone, fiber and liquids -
and I might even be said to possess a mind. I am invisible, 
44. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Princip!,e of P/,enary Congres-
sional Power, 1984 Sur. CT. REv. 255, 256; Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigra-
tion Law, 84 Co LUM. L. REv. 1 (1984). I recently discussed these cases with Ira Gollobin, 
an attorney who began immigration practice in 1933. He said he too was disappointed 
that Frankfurter could see clear to avoid stare decisis in Brown but refused to "wipe the 
slate" clean in Galvan. I speculated that Frankfurter was reluctant to challenge Con-
gressional authority over immigration because the judiciary, an unelected branch, 
would be rewriting the immigration laws. Mr. Gollobin, who argued cases before the 
Supreme Court in the Galvan era, shook his head and said, "[i]n Frankfurter, a former 
champion of civil liberties and an immigrant, it was really disappointing." Interview 
with Ira Gollobin, New York, New York (Feb. 2005). 
45. Lenni B. Benson, The Invisib/,e Worker, 27 N.CJ. INT'L & CoM. REc. 483 (2002). 
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understand, simply because people refuse to see me .... 
That invisibility to which I refer occurs because of a pecu-
liar disposition of the eyes of those with whom I come in 
contact. A matter of the construction of their inner eyes, 
those eyes with which they look through their physical 
eyes upon reality.46 
[Vol. 49 
Our laws, our statutes, and our cases refuse to see the person who is 
labeled alien. In 1954 the Supreme Court did not fully see "the 
alien Galvan." Although I am speculating based on Galvan's labor 
activities and civil rights work in California, it may have been Gal-
van's efforts to earn equal rights for Latinos in Southern California 
and to desegregate the public school system there that helped 
make him a target to the legislators seeking to purge our country of 
Communists. After Galvan's deportation to Mexico, I could find no 
reference to him. Did he live the rest of his life in Mexico? While 
he may have lost his status in the United States, surely he remained 
visible to his family, friends, and labor colleagues. How did he live 
as an invisible man? Our deportation laws silenced his social pro-
test. We made him both invisible and politically impotent. Would 
Brown have ever happened if the civil rights leaders who sought the 
inclusion of African Americans could have been deported? 
Will Freddy Vasquez remain in the United States? At some 
point his temporary protected status may end. Will he then join the 
invisible? This is the future we offer a man who was raised in the 
United States? If Freddy is going to rely on the courts to see his life 
in its full complex context and to grant his protection from govern-
ment discrimination he will most likely fail. 
As we celebrate Brown as opening our educational institutions 
and bringing down invidious racial barriers, we appropriately 
should also use the occasion to reappraise. Can we have an egalita-
rian society based on arbitrary classification and ignoring the rights 
of many people who live among us? There are small signs that 
some of our legislators are looking for a way to more fully incorpo-
rate the invisible aliens. In the spring of 2004 the Senate Judiciary 
Committee approved "The Development, Relief and Education for 
46. RALrH ELLISON, THE INVISIBLE MAN 3 (Modem Library, 1994) (1952). 
2004] SEPARATE, UNEQUAL, AND AJJEN 739 
Minors ("DREAM") Act."47 This legislation would allow non-Citl-
zens who have graduated from a U.S. high school and who have 
lived in the United States for at least five years to become lawful 
permanent residents if they complete two years of college. This leg-
islation at least recognizes that these students should be allowed to 
pursue a college education. But it is only a partial recognition that 
our immigration policies are far out of sync with the patterns of 
migration and residence in the United States. 
Perhaps one day the Supreme Court will see. this gap between 
the reality of individuals' lives and their legal status and the Court 
will question whether equality has once again been denied by arbi-
trary legal line-drawing. Perhaps one day the Supreme Court will 
revisit Galvan and the odd assortment of alienage cases and finally 
"wipe the slate clean."48 
Until that day there will be no true equality, no fair play, as 
long as the alien is only viewed through the lens of a legal status 
that bears no relationship to the reality of his life in this country. 
We must reform the law and undertake the delicate, complicated, 
and messy task of recognizing the aliens among us. Perhaps we can-
not in every case offer full incorporation, but surely our legal proce-
dures and our line-drawing can do a better job of making the 
human visible. And even if the alien must remain "separate" we can 
strive toward greater fairness and equality. 
47. S. 1545, 108th Cong. (2003), introduced on July 31, 2003. A related bill intro-
duced in the House of Representatives, Student Adjustment Act of 2003 (H.R. 1684). 
The DREAM Act has not been enacted into law. The bill awaits reintroduction in the 
109th Congress. See Andrew Stephenson, Dreaming of an Equal Future for Immigrant Chil-
dren: Federal and State Initiatives to Improve Undocumented Students' Access to Postsecondary 
Education, 46 ARiz. L. REv. 551 (2004) (discussing the legislation and the need for solu-
tions for undocumented students who are long term U.S. residents). The author won 
the American Immigration Lawyers' Association annual Dubroff writing competition 
based on this paper. 
48. See Galvan, 347 U.S. at 530-31 (explaining that since the Court was not writing 
on a clean slate, that the Court could not circumscribe Congressional power according 
to due process; authority had long since been entrusted to Congress to determine the 
scope of due process protection afforded to immigration procedures.) 

